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The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) brought 
numerous changes to European Union (EU) law in 2009. One such change 
brought the competence on foreign investment under the exclusive competence
of the EU. In light of current investment negotiations, which are eroded 
by the lack of unity amongst the EU and its Member States, this paper
explores the evolution of EU foreign investment competence before and
after the enactment of the TFEU, concluding that the competence bears 
significant limitations stemming from the past that have not been
compensated for thus far. 
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Whereas EU exclusive competence may enhance the negotiation leverage
of the EU when compared to single Member States, portfolio investments
are still excluded from the scope of the competence even after the adoption 
of the TFEU. Post-Lisbon limitations also pertain to the application of the 
TFEU to Member States’ property ownership governance despite the fact 
that investment revolves around the property rights or is even based on them. 
Such a narrow scope of competence prevents the EU from committing 
itself to guarantees due to expropriation of investments that are relatively
common to investment arbitration. Furthermore, competence conferred on 
the EU in Article 207 of the TFEU curbs implementation of harmonization 
measures should they be enacted in connection with the investment treaty.
Recent negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), however, showed the opposition of certain Member States to the 
exclusive competence of the Commission, which undermined the major 
strength of the conferral—unified negotiation power of the Union. Future 
TTIP negotiations, resistance of Member States to the already-concluded
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and legal counselors
advising their clients to optimize for an extra-EU bilateral treaty (BIT)
construction of their intra-EU BIT investments, in light of an unresolved 
conflict of intra-EU BITs with EU law, all provoke further thoughts of
future potential adjustments of EU investment competence. The EU’s
competence on foreign investment under the TFEU is still relatively new, 
but is already in need of improvement. 
I. MULTI-LEVEL CHARACTER OF EU AND NATIONAL COMPETENCES
The EU, as well as other international organizations and states, is subject 
to international public law. However, the EU is vitally different from other 
international organizations or state formations, including confederations 
or federations, because the EU acquired part of its capacity to act from the
sovereignty of its Member States. As a result, the decisions made on the
supranational EU-level are binding upon all Member States.1 The EU may
only act within the limits of the competence that the Member States decide
to attribute to the Union. The term “competence” then delineates areas of
power which Member States conferred on the Union, motivated, amongst 
others reasons, by the prospect of a more effective decision-making process 
at the level of the EU bodies.2 The distinctive feature of competence norms
 1. See Kimmo Kiljunen, The European Constitution in the Making, 2004 CENTRE
FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES 21–22, http://aei.pitt.edu/32581/1/20._EU_Constitution.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BFH4-VSAD] (noting the EU may only act within the limits of the
competence that the Member States decided to attribute to the Union); See ALINA
KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 175–76 (4th ed. 2016). 
2. See KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, supra note 1, at 176–78. 
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lies in the capacity to change legal relations.3 The authority for legislative,
judicial, and executive measures, formerly executed by the EU’s Member
States, become a sovereign power of the EU after their conferral,4 and is 
used within the institutional and procedural design of the EU. 
The areas the Member States have attributed to the EU have expanded 
remarkably over the years, and this process has had the effect of shrinking 
the individual spheres of competence of EU Member States. Exclusive
competence entitles the EU to legislate in delineated areas while simultaneously
precluding Member States from adopting measures on their own unless
authorized. On the other hand, shared and supporting competences allow
for action from both the Union and Member States. Whereas in shared 
competence, Member States adopt binding acts only if the Union has not 
exercised its own competence, supporting competence allows for the Union 
to support, coordinate, and complement actions of Member States. However, 
supporting competence does not entitle the Union to legislate in defined 
fields. 
Historically, the division of the EU’s competences was not entirely 
clear, which led to some creative interpretations by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU).5 The unclear setting of competences made
some Member States fear that the EU would encroach on their sovereignty.6 
Structural limitations on Member States’ freedom to act and on their margin 
of appreciation, which by definition happened by stealth,7 were later labeled 
as “EU competence creep” or “creeping competence drift.” Past experiences
with competence creep, however, do not converge with recent developments 
following the adoption of the TFEU, and complaints against the competence 
drift are becoming less legitimate.8  It can be stoically said that the autonomy 
of Member States fluctuates depending on the relationship with the 
3. See Gerard Conway, Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal 
Reasoning of the ECJ, 11 GERMAN L.J. 966, 975 (2010). 
4. See Kiljunen, supra note 1, at 22. 
5. See KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, supra note 1, at 87. 
6. Id.; See Conway, supra note 3, at 967, for an elaboration on horizontal and 
vertical competence relationships (asserting that the EU has not been able to for Conway’s 
assertion that the EU has not been able to define the competences in more detail than their
delineation in Article 2 TFEU).
7. Sacha Prechal, Competence Creep and General Principles of Law, 3 REV. OF 
EUR. ADMIN. L. 5, 19–20 (2010). 
8. See KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, supra note 1, at 87. 
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competences of the EU.9 The foreign investment competence of the EU
bears signs of this dynamism too. General uncertainty about the future 
collective adoption of an EU comprehensive foreign investment policy 
further fuels questions concerning the delineation of investment competence
and its potential competence creep.10 The discourse concerning the division 
of competences is extremely important for all actors involved—Member 
States, EU citizens, and the Union.11 
II. FOREIGN INVESTMENT: COMPETENCE SHIFT
Enacted on December 1, 2009, the TFEU brought numerous changes to
the EU legal system. One of the alterations contained in the TFEU was a 
change to the foreign investment competence regime, with foreign direct
investment (FDI) becoming part of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP)
thereby falling under the exclusive competence of the EU.12 Before the
TFEU was adopted, protection of FDI belonged to the competence of both 
Member States and the European Union. Member States strived for substantive 
investment safeguards on the basis of diplomatic protection and bilateral 
and multilateral treaties,13 and was one of the reasons a significant number
of BITs were signed between future Member States.
A. The Pre-Lisbon Era
The role of the EU was rather limited before the adoption of the Treaty 
of Lisbon. The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of the Union, outlined 
in Articles 131 to 134 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(TEC), did not extend to investments,14 and the protection of foreign
9. Paul P. Craig, Competence and Member State Autonomy: Causality, Consequence 
and Legitimacy 17 (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 57, 2009), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474325 [https://perma.cc/BQ8U-76UC]. 
10. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
– Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, at 2, 10, COM
(2010) 343 final (July 10, 2010) [hereinafter European Commission Communication].
11. Member States might fear unclear delimitation of the Union’s powers and EU 
citizens might demand a higher degree of legitimacy and democracy in Union’s competences 
while the Union expects such a setting of powers which would enable the community to
effectively reach their objectives and face future challenges. See KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND,
supra note 1, at 87. 
12. See ASJA SERDAREVIC, THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A COLLECTIVE ACTOR IN THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 43 (2013). 
 13. Andrej Karpat, Priame zahraničné nvestície ako oblast’ ýlučnej právomoci Eurpskej
unie [European Union’s Exclusive Competence on Foreign Direct Investment] NOTITIAE 
EX ACADEMIA BRATISLAVENSI IURISPRUDENTIAE 1/2011 94, 94 (Czech). 
14. See Christian Soderlund, Intra-EU BIT Investment Protection and the EC Treaty
24(5) J. OF INV. ARB. 455, 462 (2007). 
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investments fell within the ambit of the competences of the Member States. 
Among the instruments for safeguarding investments in EU Member 
States, BITs became the most common form of investment promotion and
protection.15 This was due to the fact that the EU’s competences were
restricted solely to market entry investment aspects, and therefore unsuitable 
for the conclusion of BITs.16  However, the overlapping existence of BITs
and EU internal market law resulted in a conflict of these two systems.
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, which
was concluded in 1957, did not foresee that the relations between the six
Member States would be governed exclusively on the level of Community
law.17 Member States slowly became parties to agreements between each 
other, but they also entered into agreements with third countries as well.18 
A great burst of external relations, particularly in the field of commerce,
occurred in the 1970s.19 However, international relations became an area
where the Member States viewed the treaty-making power of the Union 
with suspicion.20 This might have been caused by the seeming imbalance 
between the internal and external competence vested to the community by 
the TEC. The proponents of the doctrine of parallelism, which called for 
the Union to have equal powers internally and externally, viewed the
Community as having not only the competences expressly granted to it in 
the Treaty, but also the powers to take action on any topic that falls within 
its internal competence.21
 15. Id.
16. Jan Asmus Bischoff, Just a Little BIT of ‘Mixity’? The EU’s Role in the Field
of International Investment Protection Law, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1527, 1534 (2011). 
17.  Bruno de Witte, Old-Fashioned Flexibility: International Agreements Between
Member States of the European Union, in  CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM
UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY? 31, 32 (Gráinne De Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2000).
18. See id. at 33, for a discussion distinguishing inter se agreements, which are
agreements signed between two or more Member States, from inter se agreements cum 
tertiis, which are agreements concluded between a Member State and a third state.
19. Tokyo round of GATT negotiations; first trade agreements with EFTA members; 
preferential agreements with southern Mediterranean countries, Maghreb, ACP countries
as well as Latin America. While most of the competence in the CCP was at that time interpreted 
by the ECJ as exclusive, Member States were not entirely precluded from negotiations as
CCP was being implemented gradually. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, THE EVOLUTION
OF EU 226 (2011); PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, MATERIALS
321 (2011). 
20. TREVOR HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: AN 





















    
     
 
     
  
    
 
   
    
 
 
      
    
 
     
This argument is analogous to the justification behind the emergence of 
the implied powers of the Union first narrowly formulated in 1956,22 and 
further extensively developed in 1987.23 Like the doctrine of parallelism, 
the purely judicial construction24 of implied powers stems from a discrepancy
between the task given and the competence conferred for its execution.25 
The Court confirmed the theory of implied powers, arguing that if the 
Treaty confers a specific task on the EU institutions, it also must delegate
“the powers which are indispensable in order to carry out that task.”26 
The EU’s power to enter into relations with third countries was further 
strengthened through the establishment of the ERTA/AETR27 doctrine in 
the EU legal order. In the ERTA judgment, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) introduced the doctrine by stating:
To determine in a particular case the Community’s authority to enter into
international agreements, regard must be had to the whole scheme of the Treaty 
no less than to its substantive provisions. Such an authority arises not only from an
express conferment by the Treaty . . . but may equally flow from other provisions
of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, 
by the Community institutions.’28 
The teleological approach29 in the judgment represents an approval of 
the doctrine of parallelism.30 The ERTA doctrine was codified in Article 
3(2) and Article 216(1) TFEU,31 but interpretation as to how they exactly 
22. See generally Case 8/55 Fed’n Charbonnière Belgique v. High Auth., 1956 E.C.R.
246. 
23. See generally Joined Cases 281, 283-5, 287/85 Ger., Fr., et. al v. Comm’n, 1987
E.C.R. 3203. 
24. See SERDAREVIC, supra note 12, at 43. 
25. While the background of the debate concerning the doctrine of parallelism shows a
striking gap between internal and external competences, the theory of implied powers points
out to the gap between the authority given and the authority needed. HENRY SCHERMERS 
& DENIS WAELBROECK, JUD. PROTECTION IN THE EUR. UNION 374 (6th ed. 2001) (“. . . 
Community had authority to enter international agreements on subjects for which such an 
authority had not been expressly granted.”). 
26. See Joined Cases 281, 283-5, 287/85, Ger., Fr., et. al v. Comm’n, 1987 E.C.R. 3203,
¶ 28.
27. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Inland Transp. Comm., European Agreement concerning 
the Work of Crews of Vehicles Engaged in International Road Transport (AETR),
ECE/TRANS/SC.1/2006/2 (Aug. 9, 2006). 
28. See Case 22/70, Comm’n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, ¶¶ 15–16. 
29. BART VAN VOOREN & RAMSES A. WESSEL, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 87
(2014).
30. See HARTLEY, supra note 20, at 164 (“The Court therefore had to find a way of
upholding the Commission’s contention in principle, without applying to the facts of the 
case . . . . [T]his was done by holding that a transfer of treaty-making power occurred 1969 
when the internal measure came into effect.”).
31. Treaty on the Functioning of the Eur. Union, art. 216(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 47 (“The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries 
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relate to each other might pose difficulties.32 In practice, the relation
between exclusive competence that is not expressly defined and an agreement 
capable of affecting Community law should be analyzed, even in cases 
where the two areas do not necessarily overlap.33 The ERTA judgment
concludes that Member States should not engage in international obligations
that would affect internal Community law.34 Participation of the Community
in the negotiation would ensure that the result is consistent with its 
legislation.35 Holdgaard comments that the Union removes the external 
competence(s) of Member States that could affect internal Community 
law and establishes a parallel external Community competence.36 
The ECJ further opined on the implied treaty-making powers under the 
doctrine of parallelism in the World Trade Organization (WTO)37 and 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)38 
cases. Therein, the Court expressed some doubts concerning the causal
link between the internal powers and exclusive competence.39 In other
words, the fact that the Community has internal power in a specific area
does not automatically translate into exclusivity. However, two clear-cut 
cases regarding the Community’s exclusive powers are: (i) instances where the
Union’s adopted internal legislation could be affected by contracted agreement, 
and (ii) instances where the Treaty specifically express the delegation may
negotiate with non-members of the Community.40 
What started exclusively as an internal institutional dispute between the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers in ERTA, developed into a pure 
or international organizations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an 
agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies,
one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding 
Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.”) [hereinafter TFEU].
32. See Bischoff, supra note 16, at 1545. 
33. Tristan Baumé, Competence of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters: Opinion 1/03 of 7 February 2006, 7(8) Ger. L.J. 681, 683 (2006). 
34. RASS HOLDGAARD, EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL DISCOURSES 100 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2008). 
35. Piet Eeckhout, Bold Constitutionalism and Beyond, in THE PAST AND FUTURE
OF EU LAW: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
ROME TREATY 218, 220 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loïc Azoulai eds., 2010). 
36. HOLDGAARD, supra note 34, at 100. 
37.  Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267. 
38.  Opinion 2/92, 1995 E.C.R. I-521. 
39. Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, I-5414; Opinion 2/92, 1995 E.C.R. 1-512, 
I-559. 
40. HARTLEY, supra note 20, at 171. 
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federalist conflict over the division of powers. This conflict led to severe 
schisms in the Community’s legislations and were not rectified until years 
later.41 The Union, however, translated the EU’s competence into the 
successful conclusion of free trade and association agreements.42 
Member States, on the other hand, tried to restrain the ERTA doctrine 
by increasing their interest in contracting mixed association agreements,
which became a norm, even though Member States’ activity was often
technically unnecessary, and the Union had the competence to sign it 
alone.43 In the reality of international negotiations, it became more
convenient to rely on shared competence, even though according to the
ERTA doctrine, the Commission could have invoked exclusive competence
in front of the ECJ.44 The Open Skies agreement was concluded as a mixed 
agreement, being a direct result of ERTA’s jurisprudence.45 When negotiating 
topics that were not under EU exclusive competence, the negotiations would 
feature representatives of Member States as well as those of the Commission 
sitting in the room together; however, in such cases only the Commission’s
representatives spoke.46 It was often a political question as to whether the
Member States would allow the Community to proceed on its own or if
Member States would demand negotiation of a mixed agreement.47 
Agreements based on shared competence had to be ratified by national 
parliaments. As national parliaments did not usually concern themselves 
with the EU’s external policies, the ratification process was in most cases
a formality, which was sometimes intentionally delayed so that a Member 
State could gain political leverage in EU internal issues.48 Such agreements 
41. The backlash was represented by the antagonistic position of Member States 
against the adoption of Community environmental policy, as they feared that the transfer 
of internal competence would result in acquisition of external competence. Hjalte Rasmussen,
Le Juge International, in Evitant de Statuer Obeit-il a un Devoir Judiciaire Fondamental, 
29 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 252, 276 (1986). 
42. Bischoff, supra note 16, at 1535. 
43. Pieter Jan Kuijper, Fifty Years of EC/EU External Relations: Continuity and 
the Dialogue Between Judges and Member States as Constitutional Legislators, 31(6)
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1579, 1580 (2007). 
44. Id. at 1581 (“. . .it became much easier for the Member States in the Council to
insist on a mixed character of international agreements in these fields, and it required much 
persistence from the Commission and a constant willingness to go to the ECJ to invoke 
that declaration and to insist on exclusive competence. In the daily reality of external relations, 
where time is short and questions of competence have to be decided quickly, these were 
qualities that were difficult to muster.”).
45. Markus Burgstaller, European Law Challenges to Investment Arbitration, in
THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 455, 481
(Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010). 
46. Stephen Woolcock, The Treaty of Lisbon and the European Union as an Actor 
in International Trade, 1 ECIPE WORKING PAPER, Nov. 2010, at 8.
 47. ANGELOS DIMOPOULOS, EU FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 88 (2011).
48.  Stephen Woolcock, supra note 46, at 8–9. 
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are often described as mixed agreements as they combine competences of
the EU and of the Member States. Apart from the most notable mixed 
agreements, which fell under the exclusive competence of common commercial
policy, mixed agreements were also typical for governing services and
intellectual property. The complexity of requiring ratification from the EU 
as well as from Member States of such agreements raised confusion both 
within the EU as well as with the Union’s external trading partners.49 
B. The Lisbon Era 
Although the European Union has been showing signs of significant 
growth of competences over the years,50 exclusive competence on investment 
matters was not initially intended to be included in the European Treaties.51 
In the beginning, as already established, the Union’s competence related
only to the admission of new investments of third countries.52 However, 
the increasing economic interactions within the internal market, the extended 
scope of freedom of capital movement relations with third countries in the 
Maastricht Treaty, together with the intensified monetary cooperation anchored
in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, contributed to the Union’s interest in 
including FDI into the Union’s exclusive competence. Interestingly, and 
somewhat contradictorily, the Treaty of Nice introduced a concept of non­
exclusive Common Commercial Policy (CCP) powers.53 The debate about
extending the Union’s competence was materially developed further during
the Constitutional Convention meetings beginning in 2002, despite the 
discussion being insufficient in general.54 The Treaty of Lisbon broadened 
the scope of the CCP and returned to the idea of exclusive competence. 
49. Id. at 9.
 50. KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, supra note 1, at 87; Craig, supra note 9, at 23–24. 
 51. Armand de Mestral, The EU as a Maker of Investment Agreements: The Potential 
Impact on Canada and the Broader World System of Bilateral Investment Treaties, POLICY
BRIEF (2008), http://labs.carleton.ca/canadaeurope/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2008-12-18­
InvestmentAgreementsdeMestral.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K8R-WZCC]. 
52. Bischoff, supra note 16, at 1535. 
53. Marise Cremona, External Relations and External Competence of the European
Union, in THE EVOLUTION OF EI LAW 238, 246 (Paul Craig & Gráinne De Búrca eds.,
2011); Mestral, supra note 51, at 2. 
54. Miguel Poiares Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What If This Is As Good
As It Gets?, in J.H.H. WEILER & MARLENE WIND, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND
THE STATE 77, 77 (2003) (“. . .[T]he European Constitution appears as a simple functional
consequence of the process of market integration without a discussion of the values it 
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The conferral of the competence in the field of FDI to the Union was 
inconsistent. After elimination of the exclusive competence on investments
from the Constitutional Treaty at one point,55 FDI was included into
Article III-217 of the final text later on56 and was recognized as one of the
areas of the common commercial policy.57 Moreover, the characteristic 
feature of the construction of the competence in the Constitutional Treaty
was one of extraordinary vagueness.58 After the Treaty failed to get approval 
in public voting in France and the Netherlands, drafters of the TFEU did 
not follow their previous intention to include FDI within the exclusive
competence.59 An opposite stance was adopted in the latest stage of the
preparatory work of the TFEU when the CCP was amended to embrace 
FDI, leaving no room for a qualified legal discussion on that matter.60 Due
to the lack of transparency surrounding the inclusion of FDI competence 
into the EU’s exclusive competence, Meunier points out that the process 
of conferral of the investment competence happened stealthily.61 
According to Article 207(1) TFEU, FDI is considered to be part of the 
CCP of the Union.62 The Union conducts action in FDI under the exclusive 
competence as defined by Article 3 TFEU.63 The CCP is one of five scopes
of exclusive competence in the TFEU, together with the customs union, the 
establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market, monetary policy for the Member States whose currency
necessarily embodies: it has been taken as a logical constitutional conclusion without 
a constitutional debate.”). 
55.  The European Convention, SUMMARY SHEET OF PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS
CONCERNING EXTERNAL ACTION, INCLUDING DEFENCE POLICY 103, CONV 707/03 (Brussels,
2003).
56. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe art. III-216 850/03, July 18, 2003, 
Europa.
57. KOEN LENAERTS ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ¶ 20­
006 (2d ed. 2005). 
58. PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW 495 (2006) (“It is 
recalled, for instance, that, according to Article I-1(1), the Union is to exercise the competences 
conferred by the Member States ‘on Community basis’. This provision is as remarkable 
for its extraordinary vagueness as it is for its apparent disregard for the subtleties of the 
development of the Community legal order and the distinct term in which CFSP is articulated
within the new Constitutional structure.”).
59. See generally Sophie Meunier, Integration by Stealth: How the European Union
Gained Competence over Foreign Direct Investment, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 9 
(Working Paper No. RSCAS 2014/66) (Dec. 2014) http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/ 
1814/34161/RSCAS_2014_66.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/CU4G-WYPV].
60. ALEXANDERJ.BELOHLAVEK,OCHRANAPRIMYCH ZAHRANICNICH INVESTIC VEVROPSKE
UNII ¶ 479 (2010). 
61. See generally Meunier, supra note 59. 
62. See TFEU, supra note 31, art. 207(1). 
63. Id. art. 3.
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is the euro, and the conservation of marine biological resources under the 
common fisheries policy.64 
All key aspects of external trade and investment have thus come under 
exclusive EU competence, including the aforementioned mixed agreements.65 
Among others, this also applies to agreements with trade-related elements 
in services and intellectual property pursuant to Article 207(1) TFEU.66 
Up to the date when the TFEU came into effect, FDI fell under the competence
shared by the Union and the Member States. Before 2009, Member States 
would sign BITs, while the Commission would negotiate instruments concerning
trade and investment in services (such as modes in GATS), other aspects
of investment in GATT, or TRIMs.67 The inclusion of these agreements
into the exclusive competence ends the lengthy period of discussion concerning
the competence division between the Union and Member States.




FDIs, as already stated, now fall under the EU’s exclusive competence. 
Apart from the fact that the Union’s exclusive competence should enhance 
the negotiation leverage of the EU compared to single Member States,68 
there are notable limitations too. 
The first potential limitation to the competence conferred by Article 207 
TFEU is its relative incomprehensiveness regarding different forms of 
investments. The definition in the TFEU pertains only to certain forms of 
investments, namely those that are direct. Simultaneously, Member States
still retain their competence to conclude treaties on indirect forms of
investments, and Bischoff therefore concludes that the competence for
investment is mixed.69 The view, which would suggest that portfolio
 64. Id. art. 3(e).
65. Woolcock, supra note 46, at 8.
 66. TFEU, supra note 31 (“The common commercial policy shall be based on 
uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff
and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects 
of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures
of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in 
the event of dumping or subsidies.”). 
67. Woolcock, supra note 46, at 10. 
68. Burgstaller, supra note 45, at 482. 
69. Thus, contracting mixed governing indirect investments shall require activity
of the EU and Member States at the same time. Bischoff, supra note 16, at 1534. 
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investments fall under the comprehensive protection of FDI in investment
treaties, is not generally accepted by international investment law. This is
due to the fact that inclusion of portfolio investments under the definition
of FDI with no foundation in a relevant treaty is erroneous, although not 
uncommon,70 due to the close interrelation between the two.71 Although 
the categorization of portfolio investment as a form of direct investment
is not necessarily a sporadic practice in international investment law, such
a classification aptly points out that the competences conferred on the EU
in non-direct investments are not exclusive but shared since Article 4(1) 
TFEU stipulates that, “The Union shall share competence with the Member 
States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate
to the areas referred to in Articles 372 and 673 TFEU.” Although portfolio
investment is described as a specific form of investment in the shaping 
EU comprehensive investment policy,74 both FDI and portfolio investment
are viewed as significant features of economic interaction: 
70. MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
9, 196 (3d ed. 2010). 
71.  Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, 37 LL.M. 1378 (1998). 
72. TFEU, supra note 31, art. 3 (“(1.) The Union shall have exclusive competence
in the following areas: (a) customs union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market; (c) monetary policy for the Member
States whose currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of marine biological resources
under the common fisheries policy; (e) common commercial policy.  (2.) The Union shall 
also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its
conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the
Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common
rules or alter their scope.”).
 73. TFEU, supra note 31, art. 6 (“The Union shall have competence to carry out actions 
to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. The areas of such
action shall, at European level, be: (a) protection and improvement of human health; (b) 
industry; (c) culture; (d) tourism; (e) education, vocational training, youth and sport; (f) 
civil protection; (g) administrative cooperation.”).
74. European Commission Communication, supra note 10, at 2–3 (“Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is generally considered to include any foreign investment which serves
to establish lasting and direct links with the undertaking to which capital is made available 
in order to carry out an economic activity. When investments take the form of a shareholding
this objective presupposes that the shares enable the shareholder to participate effectively
in the management of that company or in its control. This contrasts with foreign investments 
where there is no intention to influence the management and control of an undertaking. Such
investments, which are often of a more short-term and sometimes speculative nature, are
commonly referred to as portfolio investments.”).
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The Lisbon Treaty’s attribution of EU exclusive competence on FDI integrates 
FDI into the common commercial policy. It also allows the EU to affirm its own 
commitment to the open investment environment which has been so fundamental 
to its prosperity and to continue promoting investment, both direct investment
and portfolio investment, also as a tool of economic development.75 
Since portfolio investments are not included in the scope of the Union’s 
exclusive FDI competence in Article 207(1), should a treaty on their 
protection be signed, these agreements would have to be ratified by the 
EU as well as by the Member States76 since they would have to be concluded
as mixed agreements.77 It is, however, possible that the Union would 
acquire full competence over FDI matters if the Court considers the AETR
doctrine, codified in Article 3(2) TFEU,78 to apply to investment treaties 
pursuant to Pringle.79 The Commission has requested that the Court determine
pursuant to the procedure envisaged by the Article 218(11) TFEU80 
whether the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore is compatible with the 
75. Id. at 11. 
76. Burgstaller, supra note 45, at 479–80. 
77. If one part of an agreement may be divided into two parts, one of which falls 
into the purview of exclusive powers, and another to the competence of EU Member
States, the agreement has to be concluded by both the Union and Member States. Should 
exclusive powers of the Union mix with non-exclusive, the Union cooperates with EU 
Member States, but may activate the competence and pre-empt Member States from their 
treaty-making powers. Marcus Klamert & Niklas Maydell, Lost in Exclusivity: Implied
Non-exclusive External Competences in Community Law, 13(4) EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 
493, 493–94 (2008). 
 78. TFEU, supra note 31, art. 3(2) (“The Union shall also have exclusive competence 
for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a 
legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.”).
79. Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland [2012], ¶¶ 100–101 
(“In that regard, it must be recalled that, under Article 3(2) TFEU, the Union is to have 
‘exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its
conclusion . . . may affect common rules or alter their scope’. It follows also from that
provision that Member States are prohibited from concluding an agreement between themselves
which might affect common rules or alter their scope. However, the arguments put forward 
in this context have not demonstrated that an agreement such as the ESM Treaty would 
have such effects.”).
80. TFEU, supra note 31, art. 218(11) (“A Member State, the European Parliament, 
the Council or the Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether 
an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court
is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties 
are revised.”).
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primary law of the EU.81 The Commission asked the Court to interpret the
scope of the Union’s exclusive and shared competence82 also in matters 
relating to foreign investments.83 To connect the dots of the EU’s investment
competence it should be recalled that the Court has established that Article 
207(1) by being part of the CCP relates only to the external action with 
third states and not the trade in the internal market.84 
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in December 2016 
suggests the Court declare the EU does not have exclusive competence
over portfolio investment regarding the conclusion of Free Trade Agreement 
with Singapore, and in so far as the Agreement applies to other than foreign 
direct investment, investment falls within the shared competences of the 
Union and its Member States.85 AG Sharpston dismissed the Commission’s
argument of extending the ERTA/AETR principle to the Agreement under
Article 3 (2) TFEU, which was submitted to the Court based on the view 
that “common rules” in Article 3 (2) TFEU should be read as to include “treaty
provisions”.86 Since there is no EU secondary legislation under Articles 
63 (1) and 64 (2) TFEU relating to types of investment other than FDI,87 
and since no other argument was presented for the competence to be
exclusive,88 the substantive rules on investments other than foreign direct 
investment in Section 9 (a) of the Agreement should be considered to fall 
under shared competence.89 
The second potential limitation to the execution of the Union’s exclusive 
competence on FDI is Article 345 TFEU. This article, which is not a 
Lisbon novelty to EU law and which is to be found in the General and 
Final Provisions of the TFEU, limits the scope of the Treaty’s application
 81. Commission Decision requesting an opinion of the Court of Justice pursuant to
article 218(11) TFEU on the competence of the Union to sign and conclude a Free Trade 
Agreement with Singapore, COM (2014) 8218 final (Oct. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Commission 
Decision].
82. Id. at 2 (“Does the Union have the requisite competence to sign and conclude
alone the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore? More specifically, which provisions of
the agreement fall within the Union’s exclusive competence?; which provisions of the 
agreement fall within the Union’s shared competence?; and is there any provision of the
agreement that falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States?”).
83. Id. at 1 (“In particular, doubts have been raised with regard to the extent and the 
nature of the Union’s competence in respect of some elements of the chapters of the 
agreement on the protection of foreign investment, transport services, intellectual property, 
transparency and sustainable development. It is therefore advisable to seek from the Court
of Justice an opinion clarifying the extent and the nature of the Union’s competence.”).
84.  Case C-137/12 Comm’n v. Council 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX 675, ¶ 56. 
85.  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Opinion Procedure 2/15 at 370. 
86. Id. at 359. 
87. Id. at 360. 
88. Id. at 361. 
89. Id. at 370. 
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in that it shall in no way prejudice Member States property ownership 
governance.90 This limitation exists despite the fact that FDI revolves
around property rights, or even is based on them.91 Such a narrow scope
of competence prevents the Union from getting directly involved in cases
of expropriation that are relatively common to investment arbitration.92 
Despite the property rights limitations on the EU level, the possibility and 
margins to expropriate, also in the public interest, is fully governed by
national laws. Although only national legal systems contain the protection 
against expropriation, in Fearon v. Irish Land Commission,93 the CJEU
subjected national expropriation rules to the principle of non-discrimination.94 
Similar development could be identified in the area of intellectual property 
rights. The Treaty of Lisbon brought about an exceptional treatment to
intellectual property rights on the European level as it allowed for their
harmonization pursuant to Article 118 TFEU.95 Before the adoption of the
TFEU, harmonization efforts at the European level were challenged.96 While 
the TFEU stipulates that European rules should not prejudice national rules 
on property rights, intellectual property (IP) rights were given a clear exception
to this rule.97 IP rights, should they be legislated in EU Member States’
 90. TFEU, supra note 31, art. 345.
 91. Karpat, supra note 13, at 100. 
92. E.g., AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22 (Oct. 30, 2008) (Award); Electrabel 
S.A. v Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 (Nov. 30, 2012) (Award); Eastern Sugar BV 
v. Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004 (Mar. 27, 2007) (Partial Award of Mar. 27, 
2007); Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA 2008-13 (Oct. 26, 2010) (Award). 
93. Robert Fearon & Co. Ltd. v. Irish Land Comm’n, Case 182/83, [1984] E.C.R. 
03677. 
94. Id. ¶ 7 (“[A]lthough Article 222 of the Treaty does not call in question the 
Member States’ right to establish a system of compulsory acquisition by public bodies, such a
system remains subject to the fundamental rule of non-discrimination, which underlies the 
chapter of the Treaty relating to the right of establishment.”).
 95. TFEU, supra note 31, art. 118 (“In the context of the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish measures for the creation of European 
intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout 
the Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, coordination and
supervision arrangements. The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure,
shall by means of regulations establish language arrangements for the European intellectual 
property rights. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament.”).
96. Case C-3 77/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, 2001
E.C.R. I-7079. 
97. DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
TEXT AND MATERIALS 397 (3rd ed. 2014). 
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national laws, shall be exercised in a manner which does not infringe EU
law. Analogically to the distinction between the adoption and the exercise 
of IP rights, it can be argued, that European measures could theoretically 
set conditions for expropriations (e.g., procedural guarantees), while respecting 
the right of Member States to execute the nationalization.98 
The third limitation to the CCP competence that was conferred on the
Union is Article 207(6) TFEU.99 This article limits the exercise of competence
in particular with regard to the supporting competences of Article 6(a)
TFEU. The EU might not be able to implement an international treaty if 
harmonization measures were to be enacted in connection with the treaty,
since the Union may not adopt harmonization measures if such competence
was not conferred on the EU.100 Examples of such implementation measures
may include possible investment treaty commitments regarding establishment
of national treatment or guarantees of effective judicial remedies in the 
98. Angelos Dimopoulos, Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the 
Post-Lisbon Era of External Relations, in EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN 
THE POST-LISBON ERA 401, 408 (Paul James Cardwell ed., 2002); Marc Bungenberg, The 
Division of Competences Between the EU and Its Member States in the Area of Investment
Politics, 2011 EUR.Y.B. INT’L ECON.L. 29, 36–37; ARTHUR HARTKAM,TOWARDS AEUROPEAN 
CIVIL CODE 324 (2011).
99. TFEU, supra note 31, art. 207 (“The exercise of the competences conferred by
this Article in the field of the common commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation 
of competences between the Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to
harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States in so far as the
Treaties exclude such harmonisation.”). 
100. As Krajewski explains: “Article 207(6) TFEU contains a limitation of the
exercise of the competences of the common commercial policy according to which the
exercise of these competences ‘shall not affect the delimitation of competences between 
the Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative 
or regulatory provisions of the Member States in so far as the Treaties exclude such
harmonisation.’ Article 207(6) TFEU contains two elements which are closely connected: 
the first part of the provision stating that the delimitation of competences between the 
Union and the Member States shall not be affected by the exercise of the competences in 
the field of the common commercial policy reiterates the general principle of limited and 
specific conferral of competences (Articles 4(1) and 5(1) and (2) TEU). In the context of
external policies this excludes a so-called ‘inverse AETR effect’ by which an implicit 
internal competence could be derived from an explicit external competence. The second 
element of Article 207(6) TFEU holds that the exercise of the trade competence may not 
lead to harmonisation where the treaty expressly prohibits this. This applies in particular
to those areas in which the Union is only competent for ‘supporting, coordinating and 
complementary action’, such as education and health (Article 6(a) TFEU). As the Lisbon 
Treaty conferred the Union with the exclusive competence to conclude trade agreements covering
services, the Union may conclude agreements covering education and health as well. However,
the Union may not implement such an agreement if these agreements would require
harmonisation measures, because the Union lacks the competence to harmonise in these 
areas.” Markus Krajewski, The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy, in EU LAW 
AFTER LISBON 21 (Andrea Biondi et al. eds., 2010). 
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investment treaty.101 In this respect, instead of centralization, the EU shows
sign of federalization where implementation of an agreement (unlike signing 
on the EU level) lies within the competence of states.102 
Furthermore, the TFEU does not contain any definition of foreign direct
investment whatsoever and this fact has to be compensated for by the CJEU 
case law.103 
IV. POSITIONING THE COMPETENCE WITHIN EU LAW
The Treaty of Lisbon impacted the allocation of competences of the 
Commission and Member States, and the Treaty development mirrors the 
expanding interrelation between international investment law and EU 
law.104 Extra-EU BITs are to be replaced with newly negotiated treaties, 
while intra-EU BITs face divergent opinions from the Commission and 
arbitral tribunals. New investment treaties (TTIP with the USA, CETA with
Canada, etc.) are to be negotiated by the EU as a block of states in the EU’s
exclusive competence. Although the EU declared its ambition to achieve 
a comprehensive investment policy,105 conflicts of intra-EU and extra-EU
BITs with EU law are to be resolved independently from each other. Cremona
aptly reminds, “. . .[T]here is a need to remember the importance of the
different objectives of integration in the internal and external dimensions 
of the ‘Union project’, a difference which is perhaps not always adequately
recognized in the demands made in relation to approximation of laws.”106 
101. Luis M. Hinojosa-Martinez, The Scope of the EU Treaty-Making Power on Foreign 
Investment: Between Wishful Thinking and Pragmatism, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 86, 104 
(2016).
102. Krajewski, supra note 100, at 22. 
103. 	  CJEU defined FDI as follows: 
[I]nvestments of any kind made by natural or legal persons which serve to
establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the 
capital and the undertakings to which the capital is made available in order to 
carry out an economic activity. . . while the shares held by the shareholder enable 
him to participate effectively in the management of that company or in its control.
Case C-326/07, Comm’n v. Italian Republic 2009 E.C.R. I-02291 ¶ 35. 
104.  Markus Burgstaller, European Law and Investment Treaties, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 181, 
183 (2009).
105. European Commission Communication, supra note 10. 
106. Cremona, supra note 53, at 239. 
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The distinction of treatments107 between extra-EU and intra-EU investment
protections may, however, lead to forum shopping through the corporate 
nationality planning. Although the predictability of the standards of protection
offered by Member States was proclaimed as a substantial resort out of 
the interaction of EU law and international investment law,108 some legal 
counselors already advise their clients to consider an option for an extra-
EU BITs legal reconstruction of national identities of their companies 
conducting foreign investment due to the fear of uncertain legal regulation 
of intra-EU BITs. 
The corporate nationality has become an elusive criterion in investment 
treaty arbitration109 and law firms have been publicly advising investors 
to restructure their investments by pulling them out of the EU, hence enabling 
them to use extra-EU BITs, which remain uncontested.110 This is due to
the fact that whether they are protected by BITs or EU law, the express
knowledge of provisions according to which investors can act would allow
investors to internalize this particular risk into their decision-making process
as to whether, how, and at what costs they invest.111 Moreover, if investors
voluntarily opt not to use legal investment protection instruments provided in
BITs in order to avoid a possible backlash against BITs in future, the investment
environment clearly does not provide for the needed legal certainty. 
Putting it in Ziegler’s words: “If the EU does not manage to quickly 
convince investors that either the existing BITs of its members or the new 
EU FTAs do provide a good protection, investors might prefer to use
vehicles in countries that do satisfy their needs in a less ambiguous way.”112 
Since extra-EU BITs are to remain in place pursuant to Regulation 1219/ 
2012, investors from EU Member States may profit from structuring their 
investment via a third state with an extra-EU BIT in order to achieve protection
similar to intra-EU BITs. Despite the shift to the exclusive competence of
the Union to contract extra-EU BITs after the ratification of the Treaty of
Lisbon, the Commission has hesitated for years to tackle intra-EU BITs and 
107.  Stephan W. Schill, Ordering Paradigms in International Investment Law:
Bilateralism – Multilateralism – Multilateralization, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 109, 121 (Douglas et al. eds., 2014). 
108. Memorandum of the European Commission Q&A: Commission launches 
comprehensive European International Investment Policy, EUR. COMM’N TRADE (July 7,
2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=590 [https://perma.cc/S36P-XQ35]. 
109. Schill, supra note 107, at 121. 
110. Sidley Austin LLP, International Arbitration Update (2/2009); Winston and
Strawn LLP, Latest Development Concerning European Investment Treaties (2012). 
111. Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty
Rights, 56 (2) HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 388 (2015). 
112. Andreas R. Ziegler, The New Competence of the European Union in the Area 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): A Third Country Perspective, in 2013 EUR. Y.B. INT’L 
ECON. L. 235, 243. 
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start procedures against each MS that has intra-EU BITs that conflict with 
EU law. Finally, in June 2015 five EU MS were requested to terminate their 
intra-EU BITs.113 
Internally, the intensification of the power struggle between the European
bodies, namely the European Parliament, the European Commission, and
the Council during the negotiation of Regulation 1219/2012 manifested
significant difficulties in communication regarding FDI between the various
administrative structures in the Union.114 This might also be due to the fact
that after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon the Parliament’s competences 
increased and Parliament’s role was substantially enhanced115 to the detriment
of the Council’s powers.116 
Taking together the Commission’s efforts to harmonize FDI in the EU,
Member States’ disagreement, ineffective communication of future intentions, 
inconsistency of attention to the distinction between intra-EU BITs and 
extra-EU BITs, the absolute lack of solutions to replace intra-EU BITs, and 
most importantly the problematic negotiations of the TTIP and the CETA, 
the expectations of smooth FDI-policy changes might not have been met 
yet.117 
113. European Commission Press Release IP/15/5198, Commission Asks Member 
States to Terminate Their Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties (June 18, 2015). 
114. Nikos Lavranos, In Defence of Member States’ BITs Gold Standard: The
Regulation 1219/2012 Establishing a Transitional Regime for Existing Extra-EU BITs – 
A Member States’ Perspective, 10 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT., March 2013, at 11–12, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2226979 [https://perma.cc/8WYM-LWP7]. Lavranos mentions that 
the battle of European Parliament against the Council and the Member States featured
“outrageous and unfounded allegations,” that European Parliament did not show any proficiency
in FDI matters, and that the relations between the Council, the Commission and European
Parliament were “heavily poisoned.” Id.
 115. Krajewski, supra note 100, at 26. 
116. Markus Krajewski, New Functions and New Powers for the European Parliament:
Assessing the Changes of the Common Commercial Policy from the Perspective of Democratic
Legitimacy, in 2013 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 10.
117. TheCommission’s report ongovernance guidelines from 2003 for instance mentions:
Promoting new forms of governance is by no means the sole responsibility of the 
European institutions, and even less so that of the Commission alone. It is the 
responsibility of all levels of public authority, private undertakings and organised 
civil society because good governance — openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence — are what the public expects at the beginning
of the 21st century.
European Commission, Report from the Commission on European Governance 5 (2003), 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/docs/comm_rapport_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG9W-56AL]
(last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
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EU investment protection has been challenged on sundry levels from
the very beginning.118 Kuijper asserts that with the adoption of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the EU even failed clearly to delineate its treaty-making powers 
and opted for a solution that may lead to a considerable controversy within
such an important area119 of the Treaty instead.120 Koutrakos criticized the
vagueness of the competence wording already in the Constitutional Treaty,121 
and Meunier pointed out that the process of investment competence conferral 
could be labelled, rather harshly, as a historical accident or action happening
by stealth.122 Cameron argues that the overlapping frameworks of EU law
and investment treaties create confusion among investors and without the 
required attention might lead to the creation of disincentives.123 Belohlavek 
believes that the Commission’s behavior in the field of FDI has been filled 
with arrogance, an attitude that can be quite deadly in a competitive globalized
international community.124 Burgstaller contends that the infringement
proceedings against Sweden, Finland, and Austria document the determination 
of the Commission to encroach on the Member States’ BITs practice even
before the Treaty of Lisbon came into the effect.125 There are also suggestions
of the continuous unqualified approach of the Parliament to the matter.126 
Leal-Arcas confirms the existing doubts surrounding FDI matters in the 
EU, pointing out the pitfalls of uncertain interpretation and the lack of 
preparations.127 Krajewski points out that the CCP has not become more
transparent through the TFEU.128 Lenk asserts that the Union’s efforts to 
form a comprehensive (intra-EU and extra-EU) investment policy has been
118. Such challenges include: ineffective translation of competence distribution into 
concluded agreements, insufficient conferral of powers to the Union, politicization of the 
Common Commercial Policy, and the involvement of the European Parliament. Marc 
Bungenberg, supra note 93, at 42. 
119. Van Vooren and Wessel refer to the CCP as the forming heart of EU external 
relations law. VAN VOOREN & WESSEL, supra note 29, at 87. 
120. Kuijper considers Article 216 an “awkward formulation” that is to codify ERTA
doctrine and Opinion 1/76, while the TFEU mentions potential or exclusive treaty-making
powers, although the Court codified them as exclusive in nature, just as Article 3 TFEU
did. See Pieter J. Kuijper, Super-Power Frustrated? The Cost of Non-Lisbon In the Field
of External Relations, in 51 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 18–19 (2009). 
121. KOUTRAKOS, supra note 58, at 495. 
122. Meunier, supra note 59. 
123. PETER D. CAMERON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW: THE PURSUIT
OF STABILITY 362 (2010).
124. BELOHLAVEK, supra note 60, ¶ 37. 
125. Burgstaller, supra note 45, at 464. 
126. Lavranos, supra note 114, at 12. 
127. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Union’s Trade and Investment Policy after 
the Treaty of Lisbon, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 463, 487 (2010). 
128. Krajewski, supra note 116, at 15. 
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affected by persistent horizontal and institutional incoherence.129 Paparinskis
explains that the first steps of the new extra-EU investment policy have
been affected by inconsistencies.130 
Despite the Commission’s active role, the competence shift within the 
CCP has not become publicly understandable.131 The most problematic
part is that none of the agents involved seem to consider the implications 
of the growing assertiveness of EU law against the international obligations
of EU Member States.132 Such consequences include the doubts of investors
as to whether they will be able to depend on investment treaties (current 
or negotiated) in the future, or whether they will be able to enforce their 
awards in the EU. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The general approach of the EU towards its trade and investment
agenda changed in 2006 into a vigorous use of bilateral negotiations as 
the Union experienced opposition from emerging countries as well as the 
U.S. The use of bilateral agreements was seen as a reliable instrument to 
efficaciously realize the Union’s market power that was in decline. The
129. Inconsistence and incoherence in stances among EU Member States, the
Commission’s argumentation between intra-EU and extra-EU aspects of investment protection, 
as well as diverging positions within the Commission’s DG Trade and DG FISMA 
(institutional incoherence). Hannes Lenk, Challenging the Notion of Coherence in EU Foreign 
Investment Policy, 8 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 6, 18–19 (2015). 
130. Martins Paparinskis, International Investment Law and the European Union: A 
Reply to Catherine Titi 26 (3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 663, 669 (2015) (“. . .the definition of most-
favoured-nation treatment in the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) explains that substantive obligations in other treaties are not ‘treatment’, unless 
particular measures are adopted pursuant to them. Why? The proposition that obligations 
in other treaties do constitute ‘treatment’ seems to be reflective of consensus in investment 
arbitration. What is the reason for such a sharp departure from a generally accepted reading
of the clause, which is seemingly expressed in the form of an interpretation of the ordinary
meaning rather than an exception? Third, the definition of fair and equitable treatment has 
been supplemented by an explanation of what conduct can constitute its breach. The idea
of elaborating fair and equitable treatment in this manner is an interesting one (even if the 
pedigree and implications of some elements may be more obvious than others). However, 
the effort to ensure greater predictability may be undercut by significant differences 
already present within the EU practice: ‘targeted discrimination’ in the CETA but not in
the draft EU–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA); a rule on contractual breaches in the 
FTA but not in the CETA; and ‘legitimate expectations’ expressed as part of the obligation
in the FTA but only something to be taken into account in application in the CETA.”).
131. Krajewski, supra note 116, at 15. 
132. BELOHLAVEK, supra note 60, ¶ 143. 
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future erosion of the EU’s market position will likely continue and this 
will contribute to favoring the use of bilateral instead of multilateral trade 
agreements with the EU.133 However, as far as competence is concerned, 
should an investment treaty be signed in the future, it shall be done in the 
Union’s competence, whose precise scope is expected to be bindingly
interpreted by the Court in the Opinion on the Free Trade Agreement with
Singapore.134 With the lack of clarity concerning the scope of the investment
competence, and a parallel elevated assertiveness of the Member States at 
the expense of the European Commission with respect to the CETA and 
TTIP in the changing political (post-Brexit) environment,135 it is questionable
whether the competence shift may yield any results for the EU even if the
CJEU pronounces the competence as exclusive, whether it is through the 
interpretation of the TFEU or the more general doctrine of implied powers. 
133. Woolcock, supra note 46, at 14. 
134. Commission Decision, supra note 81. 
135. Nikos Lavranos, Why the EU’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Competence 
Should be Re-nationalized, EFILA BLOG (Aug. 25, 2016), https://efilablog.org/2016/08/25/
why-the-eus-foreign-direct-investment-fdi-competence-should-be-re-nationalized [https://perma.
cc/8UQC-6B5K].
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